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early Michigan case held that where the defendant maliciously and
without good cause persuaded a potential buyer to reject the machine
of the plaintiff, inventor, the defendant was liable for damages sustained.' 0 In the principal case the Court of Appeals affirmed the
determination reached in Hornstein v. Podwitz,11 to the effect that
all parties wrongfully inducing a breach of contract to pay a broker
commissions are jointly and severally liable. However, the court
by basing the decision on the conspiracy to prevent the plaintiff from
earning commissions rather than upon the theory of interference with
the payment of commissions already accrued, extended the law to
include cases wherein the contractual relationship has not yet matured.
J. L. S.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESSDISTRIBUTION OF LITERATuRE.-The appellant, espiousing the creed

of Jehovah's Witnesses, knocked on doors and rang doorbells in the
defendant city for the purpose of distributing leaflets advertising a
religious meeting. For delivering a leaflet, she was convicted in the
Mayor's Court and fined on a charge of violating a city ordinance.'
On appeal from conviction, appellant claimed the ordinance was in
violation of the right of freedom of press and religion under the
Federal Constitution. 2 The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the
convictions whereupon appellant appealed to the United States
Supreme Court. Held, reversed. The ordinance is unconstitutional
because it abridges the freedom of speech and press as guaranteed
by the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.4 Martin v. City of Struthers, Ohio, 317 U. S. 589, 63
Sup. Ct. 42, 87 L. ed. 22 (1943).
10 Morgan v. Andrews, 107 Mich. 33, 64 N. W. 869 (1895).
"1224 App. Div. 11, 229 N. Y. Supp. 159 (1928), aff'd, 254 N. Y. 443,

173 N. E. 674 (1930).

I The ordinance reads as follows: "It is unlawful for any person distributing handbills, circulars or other advertisements, to ring the doorbell, sound
the door knocker, or otherwise summon the inmate or inmates of any residence
to the door for the purpose of receiving such handbills, circulars or other advertisements they or any other person with them may be distributing."
2 U. S. CoNsT. AMEND. I. "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech or of the press."
U. S. CoNsT. AMEND. XIV. Second sentence reads, in'part: "... No state
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States . . .!
3 139 Ohio St. 372, 40 N. E. (2d) 154.
4 See note 2 mtpra.
But see dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Reed: "No ideas are being suppressed. No censorship is involved. The freedom to teach or preach by word
or book is unabridged, save only the right to call a householder to the door of
his house to receive the summoner's message. I cannot expand this regulation
to a violation of the First Amendment." Martin v. Struthers, 317 U. S. 589,
63 Sup. Ct. 42, 87 L. ed. 22 (1943).
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RECENT DECISIONS

The right of freedom of speech and of the press is zealously
guarded by the United States Supreme Court. In upholding this
right, the court in the instant case declares that freedom to distribute
information to each citizen who desires to receive it is vital to the
preservation of a free society. The right of freedom-of speech and
press embraces the right to distribute literature. Door-to-door canvassing has become a most effective means for many different groups
-religious, political and commercial-to bring their ideas and opinions
immediately and directly to the individual. 6 In fact, the federal
government, at present, is encouraging the distribution of literature
in a house-to-house campaign for the purpose of selling war bonds.?
Since it is the duty of the courts to determine the validity of the
laws which are challenged as unconstitutional, the Supreme Court
will revoke those enactments which are tantamount to a censorship
of opinions or arbitrary sanction by officials.8 Such an ordinance was
declared unconstitutional because the permission of the city manager
was required. 9 In the Schneider case,' 0 the enactment was invalidated because the permission of a police officer was a prerequisite
to obtaining a license to disseminate literature. This established the
officer as a censor to determine what literature could be distributed
and who might do so. In another Jehovah's Witnesses case," the
secretary of the public welfare council had the authority to pass on
the worthiness of any charitable solicitation. This, too, was declared
void. There cannot be an outright prohibition of the distribution of
religious literature at all times. 12 Of course, the guarantee of freedom of press and speech is not absolute,' 3 and a state, in its exercise
of police power, can curb those who abuse this privilege. 14 Itis a
proper regulation where the restriction is reasonable. However, in
the Struthers case, 15 the city claimed the ordinance was for the protection of the residents, the majority of whom were engaged in the
iron and steel industry. Many were on swing shifts, working nights
and sleeping days, and the ordinary canvasser could disrupt their
sleep by ringing bells during the daytime. In addition, the ordinance
5Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444, 452, 53 Sup. Ct. 666, 82 L. ed. 949 (1933).
6 Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147, 164, 60 Sup. Ct. 146, 84 L. ed. 155
(1939).
7 "Women's Handbook", pp. 22 and 63, a publication of the Women's Section of the War Savings Staff of the Department of the Treasury.
8 Jones v. Opelika, 316 U. S. 584, 595, 62 Sup. Ct. 1231, 86 L. ed. 1691
(1943).
9 Lov I1 v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 447. 451. The ordinance forbade the distribution of any literature of any kind without written permission.
10 Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147, 60 Sup. Ct 146, 84 L. ed. i55 (1939).
11 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 60 Sup. Ct. 900, 84 L. ed. 1213
(1940).
' 2 Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444, 58 Sup. Ct. 666, 82 L. ed. 949 '(1938).
'- Gitlow v. People of State of N. Y., 268 U. S. 652, 666, 45 Sup. Ct. 625
(1925).
14Id. 268 U. S. 652, 667, 45 Sup. Ct. 625 (1925).
1 Martin v. Struthers, 317 U. S. 589, 63 Sup. Ct. 42, 87 L. ed. 22 (1943).
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was a deterrent to burglars who, posing as canvassers, could ascertain
whether the house was empty. The Supreme Court held that this
manner of distribution of literature outweighed by far the nuisances
which might result.16 Some means of identification can be required
of a stranger, in order to establish his character, authority and purpose.'7 The decision to exclude canvassers should rest with the
homeowner alone, and not with the city-unless, of course, the
individual specifically requests the city to take over his right of
exclusion. There is no criterion by which to measure what is a
reasonable restriction, and what is not. Each case rests on its own
individual facts. In the long view, the Supreme Court is guided
in its decisions by the belief that the right to disseminate religious
literature freely is essential to the spiritual guidance and high moral
standards of the itizens of a democracy.' 8
P. S. L.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-LOCAL LAW PROHIBITING ITINERANT
PEDDLING ON STREETS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.-The plaintiff who is

engaged in the business of selling ice-cream to consumers in the
streets from refrigerated motor cars, tricycles and hand carts, seeks
to enjoin the city of New York from enforcing an ordinance ' which
prohibits itinerant peddling except in enumerated circumstances. The
plaintiff contended that the law was unconstitutional inasmuch as it
was in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and Article I, Sections 1, 6 and 11 of the New York
16 See note 15 supra. Accord, Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147, 162,

60 Sup. Ct. 146, 84 L. ed. 155 (1939); Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U. S. 496.
17 See note 11 supra.

18 Cantwell v. Conn., 310 U. S. 296, 310, 60 Sup. Ct 900, 84 L. ed. 1213,
128 A. L. R. 1352.
1 N. Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE § 435--14.0. Itinerant peddling prohibited. a. It
shall be unlawful for any person to peddle, hawk, vend or sell any goods, wares

or merchandise on any of the streets of the city. b. The provisions of this
section shall not apply to: 1. Any person who operates and maintains a pushcart or other vehicle under an open air market license issued by the commissioner of public markets pursuant to the agriculture and markets law; or
to -2. Any war veteran or any widow of a war veteran who peddles under a
license issued pursuant to section thirty-two of the General Business Law;
or to- 3. Any adult blind person who operated under a license issued pursuant
to section ten of the General City Law or by the commissioner of markets
pursuant to section B36-89.0 of the code; or to-4.
Any 'person who sells
newspapers and periodicals; or to-5.
Any person who owns and operates a
farm in the city and who sells produce grown on such farm in the streets of
the city; 6. Any person who violates this section, upon conviction thereof, shall
be fined not more than ten dollars or imprisoned for not more than ten days,
or both.

